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Abstract
Research Summary: Scholars regularly use multipoint
contact (MPC) to explain how encountering rivals in
different domains shapes performance. While most
explanations rely on mutual forbearance theory, I pro-
pose that competitive deterrence does not adequately
explain how MPC shapes performance in knowledge
intensive work and argue instead that cross-domain
synergies may play a central role. I examine how secu-
rity analysts' MPC with publicly traded firms captures
synergies in their coverage portfolio, which improves
forecasting accuracy and information leadership. The
advantages of greater MPC for a focal analyst are
counterbalanced by rivals' observational learning,
which reduces the focal analyst's forecasting differentia-
tion. A natural experiment helps corroborate my argu-
ment: rival analysts' forecasting accuracy dropped for
firms in which high MPC analysts perished in the ter-
rorist attack on September 11, 2001.
Managerial Summary: Competition in the knowledge
economy often unfolds across multiple domains includ-
ing product markets, geographic locations, and cus-
tomer segments. In these settings, an actor's level of
multipoint contact (MPC) in a domain captures the
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knowledge and other synergies available to the focal
actor, which can improve performance in the domain.
In the equity research setting, an analyst's MPC on a
focal firm captures the likelihood that the analyst also
covers that firm's suppliers, customers and important
competitors. Using data on analysts' forecasting perfor-
mance between 2001 and 2013, I find that greater levels
of MPC on a focal firm predicts greater forecasting
accuracy and information leadership but also lowers
forecasting differentiation by attracting rivals who
observe and benefit from the focal analyst's knowledge.
KEYWORD S
analysts, multipoint contact, mutual forbearance, networks,
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Competition across multiple domains, including product markets, geographic locations, and
customer segments is commonplace in the knowledge economy. A notable factor shaping an
actor's performance in a focal domain of competition is multipoint contact (MPC), a structural
feature that results from the overlap of multiple actors in multiple domains. Most extant expla-
nations of the effect of MPC on an actor's performance invoke mutual forbearance theory,
which posits that MPC leads to competitive deterrence by enabling rivals to retaliate in other
domains against an actor who refuses to forbear in a focal domain (Bernheim &Whinston, 1990;
Edwards, 1955; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Yu & Cannella, 2013).
However, MPC and competitive forbearance are very different concepts that need not co-
occur. A focal actor's MPC in a domain can be driven by any process that attracts rivals to other
domains in which the actor competes. Mutual forbearance is one specific dynamic that hinges
on a feedback loop between an actor's competitive intensity and rivals' strategic outcomes. For
example, work on mutual forbearance between airlines assumes, quite reasonably, that changes
in rival airlines' ticket prices on a route exert predictable effects on the profits of a focal airlines
on that route (Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Korn & Baum, 1999; Singal, 1996). The feedback loop is
reflected in the common knowledge that competitors' price changes can directly influence the
focal airline's profits. Without a feedback loop, multipoint competitors would have no incentive
to strategically reduce competitive intensity and would lack the capability to either signal or
enforce mutual forbearance. In settings where a strong feedback loop cannot be firmly
established, forbearance does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the effect of MPC on
performance.
An actor's MPC in a focal domain describes the incidence of joint participation with compet-
itors in other domains. Extant work shows that competitors' joint participation across domains
can embed important information about how resources and knowledge relate across these
domains. For example, the joint participation patterns of diversified companies across industries
reflects relatedness in resources between these industries (Bryce & Winter, 2009; Lien &
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Klein, 2009; Wan, Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011). Other research shows that workers' patterns
of inter-industry labor mobility reflect the underlying skill relatedness between these industries
(Neffke & Henning, 2013; Neffke, Otto, & Weyh, 2017). From this perspective, greater MPC
indicates greater relatedness between the focal domain and other domains where a focal actor
competes, which may provide advantageous synergies. Existing work on MPC has not ade-
quately acknowledged the presence of this synergy channel, which may lead to incorrect infer-
ences regarding why an actor's MPC affects performance in a focal domain.
The core argument of the present paper is that the synergy channel of MPC is likely to play
a central role in explaining a focal actor's performance in knowledge-intensive tasks. First, the
deterrence channel is suppressed because the uncertain and unpredictable nature of knowl-
edge-based competition reduces actors' ability to influence their rivals' outcomes. Second, the
relatedness that MPC captures can shape the extent to which actors can leverage their existing
knowledge. Consider an academic field in which the knowledge structure is defined by scholars'
publications in several overlapping topics. A specific scholar's MPC on a focal topic reflects the
extent to which she publishes on research topics that relate closely to the focal topic. Achieving
scientific impact is highly uncertain, and the scholar's lack of publication effort in a given topic
is unlikely to enhance competing scholars' scientific impact on that topic. Although the
required feedback loop for competitive deterrence is absent, the synergy channel of MPC is
likely to shape performance. Greater MPC in the foregoing example indicates knowledge of
topics that are closely related to the focal topic. Ensuring performance-enhancing synergies
include accelerated learning rates (Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, & Marangoni, 2003) and incen-
tives to further invest in the focal topic to capitalize on those synergies (Levitt & March, 1988;
March, 1991).
The synergy channel also has implications for the emergence and directionality of spillover
effects in performance. The tendency of less knowledgeable competitors to observe and learn
from the knowledge-based outputs of more knowledgeable competitors is well-documented in
research on industrial agglomeration (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). In addition, concealing valuable
knowledge from rivals is particularly difficult when competition extends across multiple
domains (Greve, 2009). Thus the valuable knowledge of actors with greater MPC, who enjoy
the benefits of relatedness, may be exposed and used by rivals. Greater MPC may therefore con-
strain a focal actor's ability to differentiate their output from the output of rivals who can
observe and learn from the focal actor's knowledge.
The competition between sell-side security analysts (actors) in the production of publicly
traded firms' (domains) earnings forecasts provides an ideal testing ground for the synergy view
of MPC for two reasons. First, accurately estimating firms' future earnings requires interpreting
and integrating information on the firm's accounting practices, economic fundamentals, busi-
ness strategy, operations, and corporate governance (Asquith, Mikhail, & Au, 2005; Beunza &
Garud, 2007). The uncertainty inherent in this task weakens the feedback loop between an ana-
lyst's competitive intensity and rivals' outcomes. Thus, analysts are unlikely to voluntarily
reduce the quality of their forecasts because doing so does not necessarily help rivals improve
their own forecasting accuracy. Second, the setting provides the necessary conditions for com-
petitors to benefit from synergies in the firms they cover. Analysts can deliver valuable advice
to their investment clients on a focal firm when they also cover the focal firm's industry compet-
itors, critical suppliers and important customers (Bhojraj, Lee, & Oler, 2003; Brochet, Miller, &
Srinivasan, 2013; Guan, Wong, & Zhang, 2015; Sonney, 2007).
I propose that an analyst's MPC on a focal firm indicates coverage of related firms, and that
the synergies associated with this type of coverage increase the quality of the analyst's earnings
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forecasts for the focal firm. Greater MPC also leads to greater knowledge exposure and increases
the likelihood that rivals will observe and learn from the analyst's forecasts on the focal firm,
which can limit her ability to differentiate from the consensus estimate. Detailed data on ana-
lysts' annual forecasts from 2001 to 2013 allows me to capture three aspects of firm-specific fore-
casting performance: (a) accuracy, (b) information leadership, and (c) differentiation (Cooper,
Day, & Lewis, 2001; Hong & Kubik, 2003; Irvine, 2004; Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, &
Yan, 2007; Stickel, 1992). Evidence from these three performance metrics and from a natural
experiment are consistent with coverage synergies from MPC. First, greater MPC on a focal firm
is systematically associated with higher forecasting accuracy on that firm, which reflects an
understanding of the firm's operations and business environment. Second, greater MPC on a
focal firm is also systematically associated with an analyst's information leadership, which mea-
sures the influence of the analyst's forecasts on the timing of rivals' forecasts (Cooper
et al., 2001). Third, rivals tend to use the forecasts of analysts with greater MPC to guide their
own performance, yielding a negative effect from an analyst's MPC on forecast differentiation
from the consensus estimate. Finally, rivals' forecasting accuracy dropped when high MPC ana-
lysts perished on September 11, 2001 in the terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center.
This result suggests that survivors were relying on the departed analysts' firm-specific knowl-
edge to improve their own performance.
While most work on MPC focuses on its role in fostering mutual forbearance, this paper
proposes that MPC may reflect synergies available in a focal domain to actors who compete in
other related domains. Unlike mutual forbearance, the synergy channel of MPC does not
require a feedback loop between an actor's competitive intensity and rivals' strategic outcomes.
Even when the feedback loop is present, cross domain-synergies may operate in parallel to
mutual forbearance provided actors stand to benefit from greater relatedness across their
domains of competition.1 The present paper also describes why MPC is not necessarily a “free
lunch” for the actors who possess it, especially in knowledge-intensive settings (e.g., Giustiziero,
Kaul, & Wu, 2019). When an actor encounters rivals in multiple domains, those rivals have
many opportunities to observe the actor's behavior and learn from the actor. Because of this
observational learning, the actor may suffer knowledge spillovers that help her rivals and limit
her ability to differentiate from them. Observational learning can therefore create a delicate
interdependence between multidomain competitors in knowledge-based settings, even if
mutual forbearance is not especially strong.
2 | THEORY
2.1 | MPC with and without competitive deterrence
Strategy scholars have long examined MPC in association with competitive deterrence, where
MPC provides opportunities to monitor and punish rivals who refuse to forbear (Baum &
Korn, 1996; Boeker, Goodstein, Stephan, & Murmann, 1997; Gimeno & Woo, 1999;
Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999). Briefly, competitors are thought to reduce their
competitive intensity in one domain with the expectation that their rivals will reciprocally
1While it is beyond the scope of this work, the synergy channel of MPC is likely to be weakened in settings in which the
contribution of knowledge relatedness is low relative to other drivers of performance, such as operational efficiencies or
profitable opportunities for unrelated diversification across domains.
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forbear in other domains (Baum, Bowers, & Mohanram, 2016; Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; see
Yu & Cannella, 2013 for a review). This deterrence channel is premised on a feedback loop,
where an actor's increased competitive intensity in a given domain can threaten rivals'
outcomes.
The presence of a feedback loop between one actor's competitive intensity and rivals' out-
comes is a reasonable assumption in a number of settings. For example, incumbent airlines can
reduce the profitability of a particular route by expanding flight frequencies or using larger air-
craft to discourage rivals' entry into that route (Ethiraj & Zhou, 2019). By the same token, a
focal airline can also signal forbearance by increasing the price of its airfare on a certain route,
which directly helps rivals' profits on that route (Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Korn & Baum, 1999;
Singal, 1996). Similarly, a lender can signal forbearance in a given market or geographic region
by raising interest rates, adding fees or scaling down advertising because such actions are likely
to help rivals' profits (Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Mas-Ruiz, Nicolau-Gonzalbez, & Ruiz-
Moreno, 2005). The feedback loop enables the emergence of mutual forbearance in these set-
tings because the focal actor (i.e., the airline or lender) can directly help rivals' outcomes by
reducing competitive actions in a domain, while simultaneously signaling an expectation of
reciprocal treatment from rivals in other domains. By contrast, in settings where the feedback
loop is weak or absent, multipoint competitors would lack the incentive to strategically reduce
competitive intensity and would lack the capability to effectively signal their intention to for-
bear or to punish rivals.
At least two factors weaken the feedback loop required for the emergence of competitive
deterrence. The first factor is the presence of systematic outcome uncertainty, which reduces
actors' control over their own outcomes. Uncertainty introduces noise that can interrupt the
ability to effectively signal or correctly interpret rivals' signals of deterrence (Thomas &
Willig, 2006). The second factor that weakens the feedback loop and presence of mutual for-
bearance is the availability of substitutes (Ethiraj & Zhou, 2019). Competitors' market power
over customers declines with customers' increased ability to substitute away from a product or
service. Substitutability in a domain makes multipoint competitors less likely to reduce their
competitive intensity because the potential threat from customers' exit exceeds the potential
benefits from deterrence. As such, MPC scholars who study mutual forbearance among airlines
typically eliminate very short routes from their analyses (e.g., Gimeno & Woo, 1999), where the
threat of customer exit to other forms of transportation reduces the likelihood of mutual for-
bearance between airlines.
A case in point where outcome uncertainty and substitutability are likely to interrupt com-
petitive deterrence is the competition between sell-side analysts in forecasting firms' future
earnings. Investors seek analysts who can produce accurate and timely earnings forecasts, one
of the most anxiously anticipated news items on Wall Street (Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2010).2
Individual analysts who cover the same firms compete with each other on the quality of their
forecasts. Generating quality forecasts requires understanding the nuances of a firm's economic
fundamentals, accounting practices, business strategy, operations, and corporate governance
(Asquith et al., 2005; Beunza & Garud, 2007). The complexity of factors affecting firms' future
earnings adds substantial uncertainty to analysts' forecasts. This uncertainty is reflected in the
weak relationship between an analyst's decision to increase competitive intensity on a focal
2Since 2001 the equity research business model has primarily relied on brokerage commissions from investors,
particularly institutional investors, who settle trades associated with specific analysts' research through the analyst's
employer (Ljungqvist et al., 2007).
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firm, say by devoting more time and resources to its coverage in a given quarter, and the quality
of her forecasts at the end of the period.3 Uncertainty also suggests that an analyst would be
unable to tell whether a rival's inaccurate forecast is the result of a decrease in effort or an error
in the rival's assessment of the factors influencing a firm's future earnings.
In addition to outcome uncertainty, sell-side analysts face the latent threat of substitution
from in-house, buy-side analysts employed by institutional investors, who in turn represent
sell-side analysts' most important clients. Buy-side analysts conduct similar research as their
sell-side counterparts and tend to rely on the latter's narrower coverage and deeper knowledge
of specific firms to complement their own analysis of current and prospective investment tar-
gets (Barker, 1998). The potential substitutability by internal buy-side analysts means that
investors' demand is quite elastic to changes in the price or quality of sell-side research.4 A vol-
untary reduction in forecasting quality (i.e., competitive deterrence) is therefore unlikely
because doing so risks pushing dissatisfied investors toward using their own in-house research.
Together, outcome uncertainty and substitutability weaken the presence of the feedback
loop required for competitive deterrence. The absence of mutual forbearance as a dominant
dynamic between analysts provides an auspicious opportunity to examine whether the synergy
channel can provide a more satisfying explanation for the role of MPC in shaping performance.
2.2 | MPC and the synergy channel
Covering a group of firms related in important ways helps analysts develop deeper firm-specific









FIGURE 1 Two-mode network of analysts
(circles) and covered firms (squares). Ties
represent that an analyst covers a firm
3In comparison, consider the relative control over competitive outcomes experienced by airlines. One airline's change in
ticket prices in one period has a well understood and rapid effect on both its own and its rivals' profits.
4The substitutability of sell-side analyst research with in-house research recently came to a head with the enforcement,
starting in January 2018, of the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II). This regulation prevents
brokers from bundling sell-side research as an “added service” to execution services such as settling trades. The simple
act of making the price of research explicit is expected to reduce investors' demand for sell-side research dramatically. A
large survey shows an overwhelming majority of investors (78%) have plans to source less research from sell-side
analysts as a result of MiFID II (see https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/support/advocacy/mifid_ii_new-
paradigm-for-research-report.ashx).
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for this research, “expanding coverage to related companies is common practice, as this
approach aligns naturally with an analyst's expertise and makes the learning curve manageable.
Portfolio managers [i.e., analysts' clients] also appreciate research that carefully considers all
sector activity including competitors, suppliers and customers.” Despite the overarching impor-
tance of coverage relatedness, several factors introduce heterogeneity into analysts' coverage
choices. First, differences in coverage may reflect differences in analyst's individual schemas
regarding what constitutes a firm's most critical competitors, customers, or suppliers (Bhojraj
et al., 2003). Second, analysts sometimes venture into unrelated coverage to satisfy client inter-
est on a particular company that is outside their current expertise. Finally, differences in
employer resources such as access to sales and trading forces and to junior analysts can lead to
differences in the number of firms covered (which typically ranges from 8 to 18 for most ana-
lysts). Figure 1 illustrates typical overlap in the portfolios of three analysts (A, B, and C), all of
whom cover a focal firm 1* as well as two additional firms each (2, 3, 4, and 5).
Figure 1 illustrates a global analyst-firm network structure characterized by substantial-but-
imperfect overlap in coverage. Differences in coverage reflect analyst heterogeneity, whereas
similarity in coverage reflects the benefits of redeploying existing knowledge and other
resources across multiple domains of competition. These benefits are substantial, such that the
coverage universe of the group of analysts covering a focal firm will typically include that firm's
close industry competitors, as well as the focal firm's critical suppliers and important customers
(Brochet et al., 2013; Guan et al., 2015; Sonney, 2007).
Prior work on relatedness shows that the joint participation of competitors across domains
can embed important information about how resources and knowledge relate across these
domains. Pairs of industries that attract more of the same diversified companies exhibit greater
resource relatedness (e.g., Bryce & Winter, 2009; Lien & Klein, 2009), and industries that attract
a similar set of mobile workers display greater skill relatedness (Neffke et al., 2017; Neffke &
Henning, 2013). Similarly, the underlying businesses of firms attracting coverage from the same
analysts tend to be more closely related (Beatty, Liao, & Yu, 2013). For example, the 10 firms
attracting the highest number of analysts covering Apple Inc. in 2013 included five of Apple's
close competitors (Hewlett Packard, Dell, IBM, RIM, and Nokia), as well as five critical sup-













FIGURE 2 One-mode networks of firms'
relatedness. Tie thickness and weights
correspond to the number of analysts each pair
of firms has in common
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Seagate Technology, and Qualcomm). The network in Figure 1 can be transformed into a firm-
firm network (Figure 2) to illustrate this principle.5
Ties in Figure 2 represent the number of analysts each pair of firms has in common, with
thicker lines representing greater relatedness to the focal firm 1*. MPC is specific to each ana-
lyst-firm pair and refers to the relatedness of the focal firm to other firms the analyst covered.
Thus, analyst A has greater MPC on focal firm 1* than her rivals, because the rest of analyst A's
portfolio (i.e., firms 2 and 3) is related more closely to the focal firm 1* than the portfolios of
rivals B and C. I next explore how the relatedness in coverage captured by MPC shapes analysts'
forecasting performance.
2.3 | The synergy channel and forecasting performance
Research on cross-domain learning suggests that the speed of knowledge accumulation about a
focal domain increases when actors have been exposed to related domains (Schilling et al., 2003).
Research on social networks shows that participating in related domains has a positive effect on
actors' knowledge-related outcomes, including venture capitalists' interpretation of new infor-
mation (Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 2016), as well as R&D workers' ability to integrate
information from various sources (Tortoriello, McEvily, & Krackhardt, 2014) and transfer
knowledge (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). For analysts, MPC on a focal firm indicates the extent
to which other firms an analyst covered are related in important ways to the focal firm. Analysts
with greater MPC on a focal firm will therefore have more opportunities to develop a deeper,
more nuanced understanding of the focal firm than rivals who cover unrelated firms.
In addition to the learning synergies available from covering related firms, MPC also cap-
tures the analyst's likely exposure to timely information about critical competitors, customers,
and suppliers in the focal firm's ecosystem. Exposure to the focal firm's related firms can impart
material information about the future performance of the focal firm, such as supplier capacity
constraints, competitors' product developments, and early information about clients' plans to
expand or contract orders. In line with this argument, analysts seem to gain forecasting accu-
racy when covering a focal firm's closest industry competitors, as well as suppliers and cus-
tomers operating in different industries (Guan et al., 2015; Sonney, 2007).
A substantial aspect of analysts' job entails exploring new technologies adopted by the firms
they cover (Benner, 2010) and searching for unique and diverse knowledge that can provide an
edge in predicting future earnings. This exploratory component of analysts' work poses a chal-
lenge to the supposition that coverage of closely related firms is uniformly advantageous. One
alternative perspective is that covering narrowly related firms could constrain analysts' ability
to obtain diverse and unique information (Burt, 1992; Ter Wal et al., 2016). This argument sug-
gests that extensive MPC could lead not to a knowledge advantage, but instead to information
redundancy, which would hurt performance.
Informational constraints could be overcome if analysts primarily selected disparate,
unrelated firms to cover. Such a strategy, however, would impose a tremendous learning cost in
terms of time and effort. Instead of covering wildly divergent firms, sell-side analysts can
expand the diversity and uniqueness of their knowledge by going beyond the material produced
5The analyst-firm graph in Figure 1 is an example of a two-mode network (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Breiger, 1974;
Newman, Watts, & Strogatz, 2002; Prato & Stark, 2013), which can be easily transformed into a firm-firm network as in
Figure 2 (see Appendix A).
1908 URIBE
for investors by the firms' management (e.g., 10-Ks, management's earnings guidance, and
proxy statements). An important source of additional information for developing a knowledge
advantage are relationships with industry experts and firm insiders (Cohen et al., 2010; Wash-
burn & Bromiley, 2014). For example, clients praised a software analyst ranked in the presti-
gious Institutional Investor magazine for having “the deepest knowledge of software's inner
workings and great relationships in the Valley” (October, 2013). Perhaps surprisingly, greater
MPC is likely to incentivize the cultivation of these valuable relationships.
Cultivating and maintaining relationships with industry experts and company insiders
requires costly investments of time and effort, and analysts face intense pressure to efficiently
allocate these scarce resources. Thus, analysts may forego pursuing relationships with low
expected payoffs. The return on expending time, effort, and social capital on cultivating a con-
tact is more justifiable when the information gained about a firm applies to several other firms
in the analyst's coverage portfolio. In line with this logic, companies have been shown to forego
investing in exploratory technologies unless those technologies can be applied across a wide
range of processes (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991). Similarly, analysts prioritize relation-
ships with contacts that can benefit multiple firms in their coverage portfolio. For example, an
analyst would be more motivated to pursue and cultivate a relationship with an expert on a spe-
cific technology if this technology is a critical component for several firms in the analyst's port-
folio. Greater MPC is therefore likely to incentivize investing in sources of private information
that are relevant to the focal firm because the benefits of a successful search would apply to
multiple firms the analyst covers.
The synergy channel's various benefits suggest that greater MPC on a focal firm should posi-
tively predict the quality of an analyst's forecasts on that firm. A well-established metric reflecting
analysts' firm-specific knowledge is the accuracy of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. Accurately
forecasting a firm's future EPS demonstrates the analyst understands major aspects of the firm's
operations, as well as the market ecosystem affecting demand for the firm's products and services
(Loh & Mian, 2006). Forecasting accuracy is conducive to establishing greater credibility with inves-
tors (Ljungqvist et al., 2007), receiving recognition in the industry's most prestigious rankings
(Stickel, 1992), and increasing upward mobility into higher-status employers (Hong & Kubik, 2003).
In addition to issuing accurate forecasts, analysts with a knowledge advantage may issue fore-
casts that contain previously unknown information about a firm. When a focal analyst introduces
new information, rivals may quickly evaluate the credibility of the source to determine if they
should initiate a search for new information or stick to their current view. In this regard, analysts
with a knowledge advantage introduce information that is likely to influence rivals' search behav-
ior (Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010). Accounting scholars developed the concept of information leader-
ship, which captures the extent to which a focal analyst's forecasts prompt rivals to update their
own forecasts more than rivals' forecasts influence the focal analyst (Cooper et al., 2001). Informa-
tion leadership captures aspects of forecast quality complementary to accuracy (Baum et al., 2016).
Like accuracy, information leadership is associated with substantial benefits for analysts, includ-
ing higher compensation (Groysberg, Healy, & Maber, 2011; Irvine, 2004).
In summary, greater MPC on a focal firm reflects coverage of closely related firms, which
accelerates learning rates; increases exposure to relevant information about a firm's critical
competitors, customers, and suppliers; and incentivizes the cultivation of private information
sources relevant to the focal firm. This leads to my first set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis (H1A). An analyst's MPC on a focal firm is positively associated with the accuracy
of forecasts on that firm.
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Hypothesis (H1B). An analyst's MPC on a focal firm is positively associated with the informa-
tion leadership of forecasts on that firm.
2.4 | Observational learning and forecasting differentiation
According to the synergy channel, MPC on a focal firm improves the quality of forecasts on that
firm. High quality forecasts are most beneficial for the analyst's reputation when the analyst
can differentiate their forecasts from the consensus estimate (Ljungqvist et al., 2007).6
Maintaining highly differentiated forecasts, however, can be difficult. Analysts who cover the
same firms routinely listen to each other's questions and exchanges with firm management dur-
ing earnings calls. They can also access the extensive reports that other analysts write for inves-
tors in which they explain in detail how they arrived at a particular forecast or
recommendation (Merkley, Michaely, & Pacelli, 2017). Thus, analysts' knowledge on a firm is
exposed to rivals, which has important implications for analysts' ability to differentiate their
forecasts.
At least two factors suggest that analysts with greater MPC on a focal firm may be particu-
larly constrained in their ability to differentiate their forecasts on that firm. First, an actor's abil-
ity to conceal valuable knowledge decreases when rivals are met in multiple domains
(Greve, 2009). While the knowledge of two analysts covering the same firm is mutually exposed
to each other, analysts' overall knowledge exposure in a focal firm can differ widely when more
than two analysts cover the firm. These differences in exposure are illustrated by the three ana-
lysts in Figure 1 who cover the focal firm 1*. Recall that analyst A has greater MPC on firm 1*
than B and C. Note, too, that analyst A can be observed by rival B on firm 2 and by rival C on
firm 3. By contrast, analyst B (C) is not observed by rivals on firm 5 (4). Thus, the greater expo-
sure of high MPC analysts makes their knowledge appear more salient to rivals than the knowl-
edge of lower MPC analysts. Greater exposure also increases the extent to which rivals will
evaluate this knowledge as being relevant to their own performance (Goldstone & Janssen, 2005;
Rendell et al., 2010; Wisdom, Song, & Goldstone, 2013).
Second, the differences in forecasting quality suggested by the synergy channel of MPC also
play a role in observational learning because lower MPC analysts typically have more to learn
from higher MPC analysts than vice versa. To the extent that MPC is positively associated with
forecasting quality (as predicted in Hypotheses 1A and 1B), greater MPC on a focal firm
increases the likelihood that an analyst is a source of learning for rivals, while lower MPC on a
focal firm increases the likelihood than an analyst uses rivals' knowledge to boost their own
performance. A similar process is observed in industrial agglomerations, where firms with supe-
rior capabilities often have more to lose and less to gain than less capable rivals, who can learn
about their products at little to no cost (Shaver & Flyer, 2000).
In summary, greater MPC increases knowledge exposure to rivals and may also indirectly
increase the attractiveness of these analysts as a source of learning for rivals. These dynamics
introduce a possible downside of MPC. When the focal firm reveals its actual annual earnings,
the forecasts of a high MPC analyst may appear undifferentiated from the consensus because
the consensus has trailed toward that analyst's position. This leads to the second hypothesis:
6For example, in 2007 a once obscure analyst named Meredith Whitney rose to fame for accurately predicting
Citigroup's precarious financial position while her rivals' held on to bullish and retrospectively misguided predictions
for months (Lewis, 2008).
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Hypothesis (H2). An analyst's MPC on a focal firm is negatively associated with forecast differ-
entiation on that firm.
2.5 | Implications for rivals' performance
The synergy channel posits that rivals' observational learning may hinder forecasting differenti-
ation for high MPC analysts. This mechanism diverges from extant accounts that attribute a
negative association between analysts' MPC and forecast differentiation to mutual forbearance.
Prior work has proposed a deterrence channel in which high MPC analysts reduce their invest-
ment in a focal firm, resulting in undifferentiated forecasts on that firm (Bowers, Greve,
Mitsuhashi, & Baum, 2014). By contrast, the synergy channel suggests that lack of differentia-
tion is a byproduct of a directional process of observational learning; that is, lower MPC rivals
observe and learn from higher MPC analysts. The competitive deterrence channel and the syn-
ergy channel can be contrasted empirically by examining how the sudden exit of high MPC
analysts from firms' coverage network affected the forecasting accuracy of remaining rivals.7
The competitive deterrence channel accommodates two possible effects on rivals' forecasting
quality, which depend on whether a firm was located within the departing analyst's sphere of
influence or within rivals' sphere of influence (Baum et al., 2016). A central assumption of
mutual forbearance is that actors reduce competitive intensity only when a credible threat of
retaliation exists (Yu & Cannella, 2013). If the focal firm was within the departing analyst's
sphere of influence, the analyst's exit removes the threat of retaliation for remaining rivals, who
can then increase their forecasting quality in the focal firm. If instead the focal firm was within
rivals' sphere of influence, the departing analyst's exit is of little consequence to the perfor-
mance of remaining rivals. The deterrence channel, therefore, predicts either a positive effect or
a null effect on rivals' forecasting quality from the departure of a high MPC analyst. By contrast,
the synergy channel of MPC suggests that remaining rivals would lose an important source of
knowledge. Thus, the exit of a high MPC analyst should negatively affect remaining rivals' fore-
casting quality on a focal firm. This leads to the third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis (H3). An analyst's MPC on a focal firm is negatively associated with changes in
rivals' forecasting accuracy on that firm after the focal analyst's departure.
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Data and sample
I extracted unadjusted, detailed files from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) for
all available analyst forecasts of annual earnings between 2001 and 2013. The start of the period
was chosen because of the post hoc changes found in the pre-Reg FD IBES data (Mola &
Guidolin, 2009). Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) documented the improved quality of
the IBES dataset after 2000. Following previous research on analysts' forecasts, I excluded stale
forecasts issued before the previous year's actual earnings were announced (Loh & Mian, 2006)
7Hypothesis 3 focuses on forecasting accuracy, which does not depend on rivals' estimates but solely on a focal analyst's
estimates relative to the firm's actual earnings.
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and forecasts from anonymous analysts (Fang & Yasuda, 2009). I merged the IBES data with
accounting and financial data obtained from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). The institutional holdings data source was Form 13F that investment companies
and professional money managers are required to file with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) each quarter (Boldin & Ding, 2008). I removed stocks with missing returns
in CRSP for the corresponding year or that were priced under one dollar at the time of the ana-
lyst's estimate (Cohen & Lou, 2012; Fang & Yasuda, 2009). I matched the identity of the analysts
ranked by Institutional Investor magazine with each analyst's individual code in the IBES
dataset using a translation file from Thomson Reuters.
To test Hypothesis 3, I examined the effects of the tragic deaths of 16 analysts who worked in
the World Trade Center at Keefe, Bruyette, & Woods, Inc. and Sandler O'Neill + Partners during
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. By studying the exogenous changes stemming from this
catastrophic event, scholars can shed light on otherwise unobservable causal mechanisms, such as
the impact of information asymmetry in asset pricing models (Kelly & Ljungqvist, 2012). I test the
effect of these departed analysts' MPC on the firms they were covering at the time of their death on
changes to survivors' forecasting accuracy. To be included in the sample, a surviving analyst had to
have published pre-9/11 and post-9/11 forecasts on at least one firm in each of two groups: (a) the
173 firms that a victim had covered (i.e., the treatment group) and (b) the 280 firms that had not
been covered by any of the victims in the pre-9/11 period (i.e., the control group).
3.2 | Dependent variables
3.2.1 | Forecasting accuracy, information leadership, and
differentiation
To test Hypotheses 1A and 1B on analysts' forecasting quality, I followed past work to
operationalize (1) forecasting accuracy and (2) information leadership in EPS forecasts. The
Accuracy variable is simply negative forecasting error for analyst i covering stock k in year t, as







where Fikt is the last forecast issued by analyst i for firm k in year t before the firm published its
actual earnings, Akt. The absolute difference is scaled by the firm's lagged stock price Pkt–1 and
is multiplied by 10,000 to express the forecast error in terms of basis points.
Information Leadership is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the number of days between
each forecast estimate and the dates of the preceding two estimates (X1 and X2) and the sum of
the number of days between each estimate and the following two estimates (Y1 and Y2)









where n refers to each forecast issued by analyst i on firm k in each year t.8
The dependent variable for testing Hypothesis 2 is the difference between a focal analyst's
annual forecast on a focal firm and the consensus estimate for all analysts covering that firm. I




where Ckt is the outstanding consensus estimate of all analysts covering firm k at the time firm
k reports its EPS numbers for year t. To reduce skewness, I report results using the log of Accu-
racy, Information Leadership, and Differentiation, but the main results hold when using the
untransformed variables.
The dependent variable for testing Hypothesis 3 is the accuracy of EPS forecasts, as previ-
ously calculated, made by 188 surviving analysts on the earnings of 453 firms (173 affected firms
and 280 control firms) with a fiscal year ending on December 31, 2001. The pre-9/11 period
started in January 2001, when the first annual forecasts were made and ended September 10,
2001. The post-9/11 period started on September 17, 2001 when the markets re-opened and
ended when the last firms released their actual earnings in February 2002.
3.3 | Independent variables
3.3.1 | Multipoint contact
To define analyst i's MPC on firm k, I first define relatedness wkm as the number of overlapping
analysts between the focal firm k and another firm m (k 6¼ m). Analyst i's MPC on firm k, is a





where σik and σim are binary indicators equal to one (zero otherwise) if the focal analyst covers
firm k (m). In terms of the two-mode analyst–firm network, Equation (1) refers to the number
of unique 3-step paths separating each analyst from each firm.9
I update analyst–firm MPC annually to reflect coverage changes affecting the focal analyst,
the focal firm, rival analysts, or other firms in the analyst's portfolio. Because the range of cover-
age for firms and the size of an analyst's coverage portfolios vary substantially, adding a 3-step
path could be trivial in one instance but could constitute a significant change in another
instance. I address this issue by using a percentile ranking approach (Hong & Kubik, 2003).
MPC (percentile) is the analyst's percentile ranking in the distribution of MPC for all analysts
covering a focal firm. MPC (percentile) ranges from zero, when the other firms in analyst i's
8Analysts tend to adjust their annual forecasts mechanically to reflect the surprise contained in quarterly earnings
announcements; these forecast revisions are unlikely to contain new information. I controlled for the tendency of
analysts to revise year-end forecasts following the release of quarterly earnings by eliminating forecast revisions that
occurred within 5 days of the quarterly earnings report (Cooper et al., 2001).
9In Appendix B, I show that this relatedness-based definition of MPC is mathematically equivalent to the traditional
competitive-overlap-based definition advanced by mutual forbearance scholars.
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TABLE 1 Control variables




No. revisions The natural log of the number of annual forecast revisions an
analyst makes for each firm, used to proxy analysts' interest,




The natural log of the number of days from an analyst's last
forecast until a company releases its actual earnings.
Forecasts closer to the release of actual earnings tend to be
more accurate because of the availability of more up-to-date
information (Clement, 1999).
Former colleagues The percent of rivals with whom an analyst shares any past
co-employment, using historical IBES files back to 1983.
Controls for possible flows of private information between
competing analysts.
Years covering firm Number of years since an analyst began covering a specific
firm, which has been associated with a lower propensity to
herd (Ljungqvist, Marston, & Wilhelm, 2009).
Banking deals-
industry
Amount of annual business (IPOs and SEOs) in a firm's Fama
French industry underwritten by an analyst's employer in
billions, from SDC Platinum Global New Issues. The volume
of banking business in the industry is associated with
conflicts of interest that can bias analyst estimates
(Jackson, 2005).
Year/firm Log market value The natural logarithm of a firm's market value (no. of shares
outstanding × share price) at the end of the previous year,
which controls for the size of a firm's market presence.
Cumulative returns The stock's performance using holding period cumulative
returns
No. of analysts The number of analysts covering a firm, which controls for the
volume of information production (Boehmer &
Kelley, 2009).
Leverage The ratio of the book value of debt to total capital (debt plus




The percentage of outstanding shares institutional investors
owned, which influences trading activity and price
movements (Loh & Stulz, 2011).
Institutional
ownership (HHI)
A Herfindahl-type index of the concentration of ownership
among institutional investors, which can make their impact
concentrated or diffuse (Ljungqvist et al., 2007).
Coverage coherence The average similarity of the portfolios of all analysts covering
a stock, which captures investors' ease of categorizing a
firm's stock (Zuckerman, 2004).
SD earnings Captures volatility in firm's operations: the std. dev. of the
ratio of quarterly operating income before depreciation,
divided by average total assets, measured over the 20
quarters before the earnings announcement date (Berkman,
Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, & Tice, 2009).
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portfolio had the least relatedness to the focal firm k, to 1 when the other firms in i's portfolio
had the greatest relatedness among all analysts to focal firm k.
To test the Hypothesis 3, I constructed the variable Victim's MPC, which refers to the
departed analyst's pre-9/11 MPC, as previously calculated, on each of the firms they covered.
Victim's MPC captures the departed analyst's knowledge advantages in the months preceding 9/
11, as well as surviving rivals' reliance on this knowledge to guide their forecasts. For treatment
firms, Victim's MPC has a mean of 0.13 and a standard deviation 0.17 (Victim's MPC is zero for
firms in the control group, which by definition did not receive coverage from victims).
3.4 | Control variables
The accuracy, information leadership, and differentiation of earnings forecasts are influenced by
analysts' career concerns, as well as by the characteristics of their employers, their clients, and the
covered firms (Mehran & Stulz, 2007). To ensure the robustness of my results, I used a comprehen-
sive set of control variables that are known to affect forecasting accuracy, information leadership in
forecasts, and forecast differentiation. These controls include characteristics of the forecasting envi-
ronment and heterogeneity in firms and analysts. I also control for the possibility that effects are
driven by firms' categorical similarity in the minds of investors using the variable Categorical coher-
ence, as calculated in previous work (Zuckerman & Rao, 2004), as well as the possibility of rela-
tional influences between analysts using a measure of contact to Former colleagues in a focal firm.
Table 1 describes each of these variables and the logic for inclusion.
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Level Variable Description and rationale for inclusion
Forecast dispersion Standard deviation of EPS forecasts, scaled by the absolute
value of analysts' mean forecasts. Controls for uncertainty
in the information environment arising from divergent
interpretations about a company's future earnings.
Consensus error The difference between the actual EPS of firm k in year t and
the outstanding consensus estimate of all analysts covering
firm k at the time the firm announced its EPS numbers. This
variable controls for the average accuracy of the cohort of
analysts covering firm k.
Year/
analyst
Portfolio size The count of the number of firms an analyst covered in a year,
used to proxy for the demands on an analyst's attention
(Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 1997).
Employer size The total number of analysts employed at the same
organization as a focal analyst. Larger equity research
departments can provide more resources to support an
analyst's research.
Ranked analyst A binary variable coded as 1 if an analyst was ranked in the
prior year's edition of Institutional Investor (I.I.) (0
otherwise). Ranked analysts tend to be more accurate































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 3 The impact of analyst–firm MPC on analysts' forecasting quality
Forecasting accuracy Information leadership
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Days to actual EPS −0.450 −0.450 −0.087 −0.087
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
No. revisions −0.047 −0.050 −0.064 −0.065
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Market value 0.565 0.566 −0.009 −0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Leverage −0.480 −0.479 0.016 0.016
(0.036) (0.036) (0.013) (0.013)
Cumulative returns −0.334 −0.335 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Inst. ownership (HHI) −0.717 −0.715 0.005 0.006
(0.154) (0.154) (0.048) (0.048)
Inst. ownership (%) 0.242 0.243 −0.052 −0.051
(0.048) (0.048) (0.015) (0.015)
No. of analysts −0.009 −0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Coverage coherence −0.285 −0.221 −0.144 −0.122
(0.074) (0.076) (0.027) (0.028)
SD earnings 0.418 0.415 0.030 0.029
(0.153) (0.153) (0.046) (0.046)
Consensus error −2.067 −2.067 0.019 0.019
(0.022) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005)
Forecast dispersion −0.208 −0.208 0.002 0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004)
Portfolio size 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Years covering firm −0.092 −0.092 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Banking deals–industry −0.013 −0.013 −0.002 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Former colleagues −0.372 −0.394 −0.020 −0.028
(0.063) (0.064) (0.020) (0.020)
Employer size −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ranked analyst 0.040 0.037 0.009 0.008
(0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
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To test Hypothesis 3, I created Post-9/11, a binary indicator equal to one for the period from
9/11 until the last sampled firm revealed actual annual earnings (September 17, 2001 to Febru-
ary 22, 2002) and zero otherwise (January 10, 2001 to September 10, 2001). Controls for market
volatility (using the VIX index), cumulative stock returns, and average market value were
updated weekly. I used average values for the periods before and after 9/11 to control for fore-
cast dispersion and changes in the size of each analyst's portfolio.
3.5 | Analyses
Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict a positive effect from MPC on forecasting accuracy and informa-
tion leadership respectively, whereas Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative effect from MPC on fore-
casting differentiation. I use OLS regressions to test Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 2. All regressions
include highly restrictive Analyst × Firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant, unobserved
heterogeneity in the forecasts of specific analysts on specific firms. Various controls, including
year fixed effects, further account for the potential impact of market conditions. I report robust
standard errors clustered by analyst.
For Hypothesis 3, observed changes in analysts' accuracy for affected firms relative to unaf-
fected firms can be causally attributed to Victim's MPC using a difference-in-differences (D-in-
D) identification strategy (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2010). One of the
advantages of the D-in-D strategy is the ability to address endogenous processes that can chal-
lenge the causal relationship between MPC and accuracy suggested by Hypothesis 1A. For
example, if rivals were to systematically imitate the coverage choices of accurate analysts, this
process would result in greater accuracy, causing MPC to increase. Because imitation in cover-
age choices is typically slow, the sudden, exogenous shock to the coverage network used to test
Hypothesis 3 mitigates concerns of reverse causality.
To test H3, I also estimated regressions with restrictive Analyst × Firm fixed effects to con-
trol for time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity and to capture changes net of average fore-
casting accuracy for each firm–analyst pair. Coefficients reflect changes in accuracy for
forecasts a surviving rival issued for firms in the treatment group relative to changes in accuracy
for forecasts the same surviving rival issued for firms in the control group.
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Forecasting accuracy Information leadership
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
MPC (percentile) 0.076 0.026
(0.018) (0.007)
Constant −4.210 −4.236 1.294 1.285
(0.097) (0.097) (0.032) (0.032)
F test (against base model) 17.45 13.67
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0002
Note: Based on 324,266 observations (2001–2013). All models include (analyst × firm) fixed effects as well as year
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by analyst in parentheses.
Abbreviations: EPS, earnings per share; MPC, multipoint contact.
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TABLE 4 Firm uncertainty moderates the impact of MPC on forecasting accuracy
Model 1 Model 2
Days to actual EPS −0.450 −0.450
(0.006) (0.006)
No. revisions −0.050 −0.050
(0.007) (0.007)




Cumulative returns −0.335 −0.335
(0.007) (0.007)
Inst. ownership (HHI) −0.715 −0.715
(0.154) (0.154)
Inst. ownership (%) 0.243 0.243
(0.048) (0.048)
No. of analysts −0.009 −0.009
(0.001) (0.001)
Coverage coherence −0.221 −0.221
(0.076) (0.076)
SD earnings 0.415 0.413
(0.153) (0.153)
Consensus error −2.067 −2.067
(0.022) (0.022)
Portfolio size 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Years covering firm −0.092 −0.092
(0.002) (0.002)
Banking deals (industry) −0.013 −0.013
(0.005) (0.005)
Former colleagues −0.394 −0.394
(0.064) (0.064)
Employer size −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Ranked analyst 0.037 0.037
(0.016) (0.016)
Forecast dispersion −0.208 −0.258
(0.014) (0.025)




Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all variables.
Table 3 displays four models that test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The sign and direction of control
variables align with what has already been documented extensively (Clement, 1999; Clement,
Hales, & Xue, 2011; Hong & Kubik, 2003; Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000; Irvine, 2004; Loh &
Mian, 2006). The results in Model 2 show a positive effect of MPC (percentile) on forecasting accu-
racy (p < .000). Forecasting accuracy increases by 8% when an analyst moves from a value of zero
to one in theMPC (percentile) distribution. Similarly, results in Model 4 (Table 3) testing Hypothesis
1b, show a positive effect of MPC (percentile) on analysts' information leadership on a focal firm
(p < .000). Information leadership increases by about 2.6% when an analyst moves from a value of
zero to one in MPC (percentile). Notably, the effects of MPC (percentile) are in the opposite direction
of the two control variables that capture an analyst's social embeddedness with rivals (Former col-
leagues) and the employer's social embeddedness via banking deals with firms in the industry
(Banking deals-industry). The coefficients for these controls suggest that MPC in the analyst–firm
network reflects knowledge synergies and information advantages from covering related firms
rather than biases that may arise from social influence between former colleagues or from conflicts
of interest between an employer's equity research and investment banking functions.
4.1 | Channel check
It is important to note that under some conditions, the deterrence channel could also explain a
positive relationship between MPC and accuracy. For example, an analyst who believes a focal
firm is outside her rivals' sphere of influence may choose to invest greater resources in covering
that firm, which can lead to greater accuracy from MPC. This alternative explanation can be
evaluated by considering the moderating effect of uncertainty on the relationship between MPC
and forecasting accuracy. Uncertainty makes it more difficult to predict how a stock will move.
If competitive deterrence were the dominant channel, high uncertainty about a focal firm
would weaken the relationship between MPC and accuracy by reducing analysts' and rivals'
control over how they perform on a focal firm (i.e., high uncertainty would weaken the feed-
back loop). If the synergy channel is more important than deterrence, firm uncertainty should
strengthen the relationship between MPC and accuracy on a focal firm. This is because the
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2




F test (against base model) 5.29
Prob > F = 0.0215
Note: Based on 324,266 observations (2001–2013). All models include (analyst × firm) fixed effects as well as year
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by analyst in parentheses.
Abbreviations: EPS, earnings per share; MPC, multipoint contact.
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TABLE 5 The impact of analyst–firm MPC on forecast differentiation
Model 1 Model 2
Days to actual EPS 0.175 0.175
(0.004) (0.004)
No. revisions 0.059 0.060
(0.004) (0.004)




Cumulative returns −0.065 −0.065
(0.004) (0.004)
Inst. ownership (HHI) −0.040 −0.041
(0.086) (0.086)
Inst. ownership (%) 0.311 0.311
(0.028) (0.028)
No. of analysts 0.006 0.006
(0.001) (0.001)
Coverage coherence 0.059 0.031
(0.044) (0.046)
SD earnings 0.130 0.131
(0.100) (0.100)
Consensus error 0.695 0.695
(0.013) (0.013)
Forecast dispersion 0.393 0.393
(0.010) (0.010)
Portfolio size −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Years covering firm 0.024 0.024
(0.001) (0.001)
Banking deals–industry 0.009 0.009
(0.003) (0.003)
Former colleagues −0.020 −0.011
(0.037) (0.037)
Employer size 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)





marginal value of having a more related portfolio would be greater when forecasting the earn-
ings of a difficult-to-predict firm.
A measure for firm-level outcome uncertainty used in prior research is analysts' forecast dis-
persion (e.g., Haunschild, 1994). Dispersion reflects the inherent difficulty of deciphering a focal
firm's prospects (Diether, Malloy, & Scherbina, 2002; Jackson, 2005; Johnson, 2004). Thus,
according to the synergy (deterrence) channel, the accuracy from analyst i's greater MPC should
increase (decrease) as a function of the forecast dispersion of focal firm k. Table 4 contains
results from models that extend Model 2 in Table 3 by adding the interactive effect of forecast
dispersion and MPC. The models in Table 4 provide further support for the synergy channel of
MPC. The positive effect of MPC × Dispersion reveals that the benefits of MPC on accuracy
increase when forecast dispersion is high (p = .022). Analysis of marginal effects holding Disper-
sion at its minimum (maximum) level in the sample show a 6% (22%) increase in accuracy
when increasing MPC (percentile) from zero to one.
To test Hypothesis 2, which predicts a negative effect of MPC on forecast differentiation, I
regressed the independent variables used in Table 3 on Forecast Differentiation. Model 2 (Table 5)
shows that MPC (percentile) has a negative effect on the distance between an analyst's forecast and
the consensus estimate (p = .003). Forecast differentiation decreases by about 3.3% when an analyst
moves from a value of zero to one in MPC (percentile). Although MPC is strongly associated with
knowledge advantages that enable making accurate forecasts and issuing forecast updates that
influence rivals (Models 2 and 4 in Table 3), this knowledge also attracts rivals' forecasts, making it
difficult to differentiate from the consensus estimate (Model 2 in Table 5).
Hypothesis 3 predicts reductions in surviving rivals' accuracy as a function of the MPC of departed
analysts. Table 6 displays models that test the impact on rivals' accuracy of the sudden loss of fore-
casters with various levels of MPC on each stock. Model 1 in Table 6 displays coefficients for the con-
trol variables. Model 2 includes the main effect of the Post-9/11 period and the interaction with
Victim's MPC. Model 2 shows that the forecasting accuracy of surviving analysts decreased post-9/11 as
a function of victims' MPC on a focal firm (p = .045). Differences in marginal effects show that forecast-
ing accuracy for survivors decreased by 84% more when a stock lost a victim who had a value of one
for MPC (percentile) compared to a stock that lost a victim who had a value of zero for MPC (percen-
tile). The effects of losing analysts in the 9/11 tragedy had a substantial impact on survivors' accuracy
for nearly 3 months.10 This result points to survivors having established a degree of reliance on the
knowledge of high MPC analysts who lost their lives on 9/11.
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.073 0.084
(0.058) (0.058)
F test (against base model) 8.98
Prob > F = 0.0003
Note: Based on 324,266 observations (2001–2013). All models include (analyst × firm) fixed effects as well as year
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by analyst in parentheses.
Abbreviations: EPS, earnings per share; MPC, multipoint contact.
10In additional tests, the effects of Victim's MPC on survivors' accuracy dampen and disappear if the post-9/11 period is extended
to include the subsequent fiscal year, possibly as equity research departments reorganized the coverage of affected firms.
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4.2 | Alternative explanations and robustness tests
A possible explanation for the results in Table 6 is that the reduced competition from the exit of
analysts from a firm's coverage may have decreased the effort and motivation that surviving
analysts exerted on covering the firm after the shock, which can reduce their forecasting accu-
racy (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2010). To address this alternative explanation, I control for Competi-
tive intensity, the average number of unique analysts covering a focal firm, measured at the pre-
and post-shock periods (Table 6). Competitive intensity accounts for changes from the pre-shock
period in the amount of competition that each survivor on each firm in the post-shock period
faced. The effect of Post-9/11 × Victim's MPC is robust to including this control variable.
TABLE 6 Effect of victims' MPC on survivors' forecasting accuracy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Portfolio size −0.011 −0.012 −0.012 0.029
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Weekly avg. market value 0.462 0.478 0.479 0.166
(0.145) (0.146) (0.150) (0.125)
Weekly market uncertainty −0.060 −0.060 −0.060 0.043
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Weekly cumulative returns −0.367 −0.391 −0.378 0.930
(0.512) (0.507) (0.511) (0.654)
Monthly dispersion 0.063 0.062 0.057 0.206
(0.279) (0.285) (0.282) (0.329)
Competitive intensity 0.061 0.056 0.059 0.151
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032)
Post 9/11 period 1.433 1.480 1.502
(0.092) (0.094) (0.113)
Post 9/11 × victims' MPC −0.610
(0.297)
Post 9/11 × treated stock −0.122
(0.092)
Post 6/01 period 0.816
(0.146)
Post 6/01 × victims' MPC −0.422
(0.521)
F-statistic 58.72 52.90 53.46 17.87
Adj. R2 .663 .663 .663 .555
Note: N = 3,240 observations for 188 analysts and 453 firms. Includes forecasts issued between January 2001 and
February 2002. All models include 1,620 (analyst × firm) fixed effects. Robust standard errors with two-way clus-
tering in parentheses (week of forecast and analyst × firm panel).
Abbreviation: MPC, multipoint contact.
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Another possible explanation is that the reduction in forecasting accuracy reflects an
increase in aggregate uncertainty in the business environment, which had a sizable hampering
effect on corporate investment rates (Kim & Kung, 2016). In this explanation, the uncertainty
in the overall business outlook, rather than the loss of knowledgeable rivals, is the main imped-
iment to survivors' forecasting accuracy. I address this possible explanation empirically by
adding a control for the weekly VIX index, a measure of overall market uncertainty. Recent
research also suggests that 9/11 may have shifted the preferences and job choices of professional
workers (Carnahan, Kryscynski, & Olson, 2017). In the present case, it is easy to imagine that
the dramatic impact of the tragedy on survivors could have reduced the amount of effort survi-
vors were willing to invest into their forecasts in the months following 9/11. A general decrease
in analyst's ability or desire to invest in accuracy would not explain the current findings because
my models compare relative changes in accuracy within a specific analyst–firm combination
with relative changes for firms in the control group.
The coefficient of interest in Model 2 of Table 6 (Post-9/11 × Victim's MPC) could be driven
by yet another alternative process; namely, the accuracy of surviving analysts decreased for
firms in the treatment group because less information was available about firms that lost a cov-
ering analyst. Because this alternative does not rely on the victim's MPC on the focal firm, I
tested this explanation by replacing Victim's MPC with an indicator of whether a firm belonged
to the treatment group (Treated firm = 1) or not (Treated firm = 0). If the results are driven by
changes in the information available about treatment firms rather than by the victim's level of
MPC, the coefficient for the Treated firm variable should capture variation in forecasting accu-
racy better than Victim's MPC. This alternative explanation lacks statistical support. The coeffi-
cient on the Post-9/11 × Treated firm variable (Table 6, Model 3) is smaller in magnitude and
has larger standard errors than the coefficient on Post-9/11 × Victim's MPC (Table 6, Model 2).
This result provides additional evidence that the survivors' forecasting accuracy decreased spe-
cifically due to the loss of a high MPC analyst.
An assumption of D-in-D models is that the treatment and control groups have parallel
trends before the treatment event. If analysts were equally accurate on both groups of firms
before 9/11, then resetting the treatment date to an earlier time should not produce significant
results. Model 4 (Table 6) tests the parallel trends assumption by replacing 9/11 with 6/01, a
date that halves the number of pre-9/11 forecast estimates. The coefficients in Model 4 (Table 6)
are reassuring in that the placebo regression does not capture a loss of accuracy in the post-6/01
period from the MPC of future victims, who continued actively forecasting until 9/11.
5 | DISCUSSION
Prevalent accounts of MPC focus almost exclusively on how MPC shapes performance by trig-
gering competitive deterrence. I argue that the feedback loop required for deterrence may be
absent in several competitive environments, where MPC nonetheless captures synergies avail-
able from participating in related domains. I propose that under these conditions, the associa-
tion between greater MPC and performance is influenced by the synergies available to an actor
competing in domains related to the focal domain. These dynamics generalize to several set-
tings in which related knowledge domains can confer an advantage, including competition for
patents in different knowledge domains (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2002; Theeke & Lee, 2017).
Although MPC can reflect greater knowledge synergies, under conditions of observability, high
MPC actors risk attracting rivals' emulation.
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The empirical results support the impact of MPC on three important dimensions of competi-
tive advantage in the equity research setting: (a) the quality of actors' knowledge (H1), (b) the
uniqueness of their knowledge (H2), and (c) rivals' reliance on observed knowledge (H3).
Greater MPC reflects financial analysts' coverage of firms related more closely to the focal firm,
which affords relevant information, facilitates interpretation, and provides incentives to invest
in cultivating private sources of firm-specific knowledge. Thus, greater MPC in a firm's coverage
network is associated with more accurate and influential earnings forecasts (Table 3, Models 2
and 4). Similarly, MPC captures a focal analyst's exposure to rivals who can observe and are
motivated to learn from the analyst's knowledge about the focal firm. The implied directionality
in observational learning hampers high MPC analysts' ability to differentiate forecasts from the
consensus estimate (Table 5, Model 2). Rivals tend to rely on the knowledge of high MPC ana-
lysts to improve their own forecasts, thereby losing accuracy in the absence of this knowledge
(Table 6, Model 2).
The present paper bridges work on MPC with the literature that uses the distribution of
competitors across domains to capture relatedness (Bryce & Winter, 2009; Lien & Klein, 2009;
Neffke, Hartog, Boschma, & Henning, 2018; Wan et al., 2011). Although most work in the MPC
tradition focuses on the role of MPC in creating mutual forbearance, scholars should be aware
that MPC also captures the relatedness of the domains in which an actor competes. In the appli-
cation to equity research, the synergy channel of MPC provides an overarching theory that can
explain the impact of MPC on forecasting quality and forecast differentiation.
More broadly, the present work has implications for theories of evaluation in financial
markets. Foundational scholarship in this area has proposed that a focal firm's average MPC
(called categorical coherence in that work) captures how well the firm corresponds with
investors' categorical schemas (Zuckerman, 2000, 2004; Zuckerman & Rao, 2004). Rather than
ease of categorization, the present work suggests that synergies can explain lower stock vola-
tility (Zuckerman, 2004) and generous valuations (Zuckerman, 1999) afforded to firms when
their covering analysts hold highly related portfolios. High average MPC (i.e., high coverage
coherence) means that a focal firm is covered by analysts with extensive knowledge about the
firm's ecosystem of interdependencies with other firms, including close competitors, critical
suppliers, and customers. The ensuing knowledge advantages could enable these analysts to
produce earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that investors view as more reliable
and less speculative, exerting downward pressure on stock volatility and upward pressure on
valuations.
5.1 | Limitations
The present work sought to establish a synergy channel of analysts' MPC based on evidence
from several dimensions of forecasting performance. The panel data methods employed are well
suited to this purpose; indeed, they permit modeling exogenous changes to firms' coverage,
which would be difficult with approaches that accommodate endogenous network processes,
including Stochastic Actor Oriented Models (SAOMs) (Hollway, Lomi, Pallotti, &
Stadtfeld, 2017; Snijders, Lomi, & Torló, 2013; Wang, Pattison, & Robins, 2013). At the same
time, analysts' are known to influence each other's coverage choices (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001),
and the present study's research design does not address questions regarding the endogenous
evolution of MPC. Rivals may not be confined to learning from the domain-specific knowledge
of high MPC actors, but may also imitate their entry decisions into a domain (Anand, Mesquita,
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& Vassolo, 2009; Ethiraj & Zhu, 2008). These endogenous factors may undermine or reinforce
the synergy channel, and future work can shed light on the evolution of MPC over time, includ-
ing factors that lead to convergence and divergence in domain overlap (Stadtfeld, Mascia,
Pallotti, & Lomi, 2016).
A second limitation is that the synergy channel of MPC depends on a strategy of related
diversification as an important factor guiding competitors' domain selection. For example, the
synergy channel would be weakened if most actors followed a strategy of unrelated diversifica-
tion, because MPC would not capture the underlying relatedness of domains of competition.
Relatedness seems to play an important role in the competitive decisions actors make across
various knowledge intensive settings (e.g., Giustiziero et al., 2019), but different concerns such
as operational efficiencies may matter more than relatedness in other settings. In fact, when the
feedback loop is strong, actors may create MPC by seeking out rivals to establish and enforce
mutual forbearance (Gimeno, 2002). Further work is required to understand the full influence
of MPC, particularly when competitive conditions are likely to activate both competitive deter-
rence and the synergy channel. A critical challenge will be identifying separate contingencies
that can contrast the feedback loop required for competitive deterrence with the requirements
of cross-domain synergies.
Much research has examined how MPC shapes performance through competitive deter-
rence. I extend the meaning of MPC to encompass a synergy channel, which can shape perfor-
mance even when mutual forbearance is not particularly strong. Although the relatedness of
domains captured by an actor's MPC may increase output quality in a focal domain, it can also
reduce the ability to differentiate from rivals. The present study provides an initial effort toward
understanding these interdependent effects of the synergy channel of MPC.
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APPENDIX A: FROM ACTOR–DOMAIN TO DOMAIN–DOMAIN
NETWORKS
The distribution of actors across domains of competition, illustrated in Figure 1 for analysts cover-
ing firms, is contained in a binary adjacency matrix X of K domains and I actors (dimensions K × I).
Each (k, i)th entry in X is equal to one if actor i competes in domain k and zero otherwise. Two dif-
ferent one-mode networks,W and Y, can be derived from X such that all of the information in both
W and Y is contained in X (Newman et al., 2002). Let W be the domain × domain square symmet-
ric matrix (W = XX0) capturing domains' relatedness (this network is illustrated in Figure 2), and Y
be the actor × actor square symmetric matrix (Y = X0X) capturing actors' competitive overlap.
Diagonal entries in W are the number of actors who compete in domain k, and diagonal entries in
Y denote the total number of domains in which actor i competes. Off-diagonal entries in W (wkm)
are the number of common actors competing in a k, m pair of domains (k 6¼ m); off-diagonal entries
in Y (yij) are the number of common domains in which a pair of actors i and j compete (i 6¼ j).
The transformation of the two-mode network X into two one-mode networks Y and W sug-
gest two alternative definitions of MPC. The traditional definition of MPC used in previous
work is based on matrix Y, the patterns of competitive overlap between an actor i and all rivals
competing in k. I use a mathematically equivalent definition based on network W, which
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captures the relatedness of k to other domains m in which actor i competes. These two expres-
sions and a proof of their equality are provided in Appendix B.
APPENDIX B: MPC AS MEASURE OF DOMAIN RELATEDNESS
I define MPC as a function of wkm which captures the relatedness of k to other domains m in





where σik, σim are binary indicators equal to one if actor i competes in domain k(m), and zero
otherwise.
In previous work MPC is defined as a function of yij the competitive overlap between i and







where σjk is a binary indicator equal to one if rival j competes in domain k, and zero
otherwise.11
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wkmσim) 1ð Þ= 2ð Þ
Q.E.D.
Both Equations (B1) and (B2) refer to the number of unique three-step paths connecting
any actor i and any domain k in an actor-domain network. The equality of both definitions can
be confirmed in Figure 1. For example, there are two unique three-step paths between analyst
A and focal firm 1*:
1ð ÞMPCA1*= yAB−σA1*ð ÞσB1*+ yAC−σA1*ð ÞσC1*=1+1=2
2ð ÞMPCA1* = w1*2−σA1*ð ÞσA2+ w1*3−σA1*ð ÞσA3+ w1*4−σA1*ð ÞσA4+ w1*5−σA1*ð ÞσA5=1+1+0+0=2
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